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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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corporation, ' 
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-vs.-
THOMPSON FLYING SERVICE 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 9613 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Distriet Court 
for Salt Lake County 
HoN. RAY VANCoTT, JR., Judge. 
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Appellant 
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Salt Lake 'City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THOMPSON FLYING SERVI·CE 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, INC., 
Defendant an.d Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
No. 9613 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for property damage to an airplane 
owned by plaintiff's assignor, arising out of a fire at an 
airplane hangar operated by the defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and 
judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGI-IT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and en-
try of judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or that 
failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FkCTS 
Plaintiff brought the present action in two counts, 
claiming as assignee of one Gary Brimhall, the owner of 
a certain Bellanca Airplane. (R.l-2). Plaintiff's first 
count is based upon the theory of conversion. (R.1.); 
the second count is based upon the theory of negligence. 
(R. 1-2). Defendant by its answer admitted that a fire 
occurred in the hangar where the plane was stored. (R. -±.) 
All of the other material allegations of the complaint were 
denied. (R. 3-4). 
At trial, the only evidence offered by the plaintiff 
was the testimony of Gary Brilnhall, the owner of the air-
plane in question. The sum and substance of Brimhall's 
testimony was that he arranged with defendant for the 
rental of a "T" hangar at l\1:unicipal Airport #1. It was 
his understanding of the agreement that he rented the No. 
1 "T" hangar, and had the right to the exclusive use of 
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it. Defendant had no right to go into it for any purpose. 
Neither did anyone else have a right to go into it for any 
purpose. l:-le was not paying for airplane storage, but 
for ,hangar space. He parked his car in the hangar when 
he was flying the plane. ( R. 28-29). 
Brimhall last flew the plane around Thanksgiving 
of 1960. (R. 26). Sorne time thereafter, the exact or ap--
proximate date of which was not established, Brimhall 
discovered that his plane had been rernoved from the "T·'' 
hangar and placed in a larger hangar owned and operated 
by defendant, with several other planes. (R. 26). Brim-
hall made no cornplaint whatsoever to defendant about 
this and he assumed that the plane was rernoved because 
his account was delinquent. Admittedly, at the time 
of the fire, his account was delinquent in approximately 
the amount of $2200. (R. 26-27). He never asked per-
mission to fly the plane after it was removed to the large 
hangar. He admitted that he was never refused permis-
sion to fly it, and that he made no protest to defendant 
concerning the removal of the plane. (R. 27). 
The entire thn1st of Brimhall's testimony was to 
the effect that the relationship between himself and de-
fendant was one of landlord and tenant, and not of bail-
ment or storage. He regarded himself as the lessee of 
• 'T" Hangar #1, and he interpreted the removal of the 
plane from "T" Hangar #1 as a conversion of the plane. 
Upon the presentation of Brimhall's testimony, the 
plaintiff rested. (R. 32). Defendant likewise rested with-
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out having offered any evidence at all. (R 32). Promptly 
thereafter, defendant moved for a directed verdict on 
both counts of plaintiff's complaint for the following 
grounds and reasons : 
A. As to the first count: 
1. That there was no evidence of a conversion; and 
2. That defendant had a right, as lienor, to take 
possession of the plane. (R. 32). 
B. As to the negligence count: 
1. That there was no evidence of any contract of 
bailment between the owner and the defendant; 
2. That there was no evidence of any negligence on 
the part of the defendant; and 
3. That there was no evidence that any negligence 
on the part of defendant caused the fire. (R. 33). 
After argument this motion \Yas denied by the court, 
(R. 33), and the case was submitted to the jury on both 
of plaintiff's theories. (R. 61-67). With regard to the 
negligence count, the Court, by its instruction No. 6, 
charged the jury as follows: 
"If you find from the evidence in this case 
that the relationship between Briniliall and the 
Th01npson Flying Service was that of bailment 
and, if you further find that Brimhall's airplane 
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"·as da1naged as a result of a fire while it was 
in the possession of the defendant you may infer 
frmn that fact that the defendant was negligent 
and that his negligence was the proximate cause of 
the dmnage to the airp]ane. Such an inference 
does not mnount to a preponderance of the evi-
dence but you may use such inference as a basis 
for finding by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant was negligent." (R. 67). 
Defendant duly excepted to the giving of said in-
struction. ( R. 3±). Defendant by its request No. 11, re-
quested the Court to charge the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed that the mere fact that a 
fire occurred, standing alone, is no evidence of 
any negligence on the part of defendant." (R.51) 
Exception was likewise taken to the court's refusal 
to grant this request. (R. 34). 
The jury returned a verdict favorable to the defend-
ant and against the plaintiff on the first count, that is, 
the conversion count, and in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant on the second, or negligence count, 
in the stipulated anwunt of the damages, less the agreed 
set-off for storage charges, or a total of $4,997 .55. (R. 75). 
Defendant made a timely motion to set aside the 
verdict and judgment and to enter judgment for the 
defendant, or in the alternative for a new trial (R. 77), 
which motion was in due course argued to the court and 
denied. (R. 78). This appeal followed. (R. 79) 
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STATE~1ENT OF POINTS UPON \VHICH 
APPELLANT RELIES 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF HAVING TRIED THE CASE ON THE 
THEORY OF CONVERSION, WAS ESTOPPED TO RELY UP-
ON THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A GROUND OF 
RECOVERY. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 'TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT UPON THE THEORY 
OF NEGLIGENCE, AND 'THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT 
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY 
TO LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE 
JURY, AS TO THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF, OR AS TO 
THE DUTIES OF DEFENDANT, OR AS TO THE LAW OF 
BAILMENT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
ARGUJ\1ENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF HAVING TRIED THE CASE ON THE 
THEORY OF CONVERSION, WAS ESTOPPED TO RELY UP-
ON THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A GROUND OF 
RECOVERY. 
The position consistently taken by the plaintiff in 
this case, in its pleadings, at pretrial, and at trial, has 
been that the relationship between the owner Brimhall 
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and the defendant was that of landlord and tenant, and 
that when the defendant reuwved the owner's airplane 
fr01n the · 'T" hangar and placed it in another hangar, 
defendant was guilty of conversion. Upon this theory 
the case was tried. This was the burden and effect of 
the only proof offered by plaintiff at trial, the testimony 
of the owner Brinlhall, and having elected to proceed 
upon that theory, plaintiff was estopped to rely upon 
the theory of negligence, based upon a bailment relation-
ship. 
Although there is no extensive authority on this 
point, so far as our research reveals, one recent Ohio 
case fairly indicates the rule. United Fire Insurance Co. 
v. Paramount Fnr Service, Inc., 168 Ohio St. 431, 156 
NE2d 121. In that case the owner had bailed her fur for 
storage with the defendant. The original bailor, without 
the authority of the owner, had entered into a sub-
contract of baihnent with another. \Vhile the fur was 
in the possession of the sub-bailee, it vvas lost or de-
stroyed. Plaintiff proceeded against the original bailee 
upon the theory of conversion. However, recovery against 
the bailee was lin1ited to the sum of $100, that being the 
agreed value of the cost according to the contract of 
baihuent. Plaintiff then sought to recover against the 
sub-bailee upon the theory of negligence. The court held 
that having elected to treat the original bailee as a con-
verter, the owner could not take the inconsistent position 
of suing the second bailee for loss resulting from negli-
gence. 
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Although the present case does not involve separate 
hailees, the logic of the Ohio Court in that case is equally 
applicable here. Having elected to proceed against the 
defendant upon the theory of conversion, plaintiff is 
estopped to rely on the inconsistent theory of negligence, 
arising out of a relationship entirely different from tl1at 
attempted to be proved by plaintiff at trial. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINS'T THE DEFENDANT UPON THE 'THEORY 
OF NEGLIGENCE, AND 'THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT 
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY 
TO LAW. 
Plaintiff, having alleged and relied upon, and having 
attempted to prove, a contract of landlord and tenant, 
cannot now claim that the original contract was one of 
bailment for hire. If there was any bailment whatsoever, 
it was a constructive bailment resulting from the failure 
of defendant to conllilence foreclosure proceedings on its 
landlord's lien within 30 days after termination of the 
tenancy relationship. As heretofore noted there is no 
evidence in the record as to the time when the plane 
was removed from the "T" hangar to the big hangar, 
and therefore there is no evidence, much less a prepond-
erance of the evidence, from which a jury could find 
that the 30 day period had elapsed, and that defendant 
had become a constructive bailee. Assuming, however, 
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that the :30 day period had elapsed, defendant, if a bailee 
at all, \n>Uld be only a constructive bailee, that is, a 
gratuitous bailee. 
This rule is also expressed in the case of U nite,d Fire 
Insunrnce Co. v. Pantrnount Fur Service, Inc., 168 Ohio 
St. -:1:31, 156 NE2d 121. The court there said: 
''Where otherwise than by a mutual contract 
of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the 
possession of personal property of another, the 
one in possession is, by operation of law, generally 
treated as a bailee of such property and may 
therefore reasonably be referred to as a construc-
tive bailee. . . " 
See also Armored Car Service, Inc. v. First National 
Bank, (Fla. App.), 114 So. 2d 431, where the court said: 
"Therefore, where the possession of one's per-
sonal property passes to another by mistake, acci-
dent or through force of circumstances under 
which the law imposes upon the recipient thereof 
the duty and obligation of a bailee, when there is 
a lack of a meeting of the minds, an absence of any 
voluntary tmdertaking, and no reasonable basis 
for implying an interest of an Inutual benefit, 
the baihnent resulting is a constructive bailment 
and gratuitious." 
Defendant, if a bailee at all, was a constructive bail-
ee, or gratuitous bailee, and as such owed the owner a 
duty only of slight care, or stated differently, would he 
liable only for gross negligence in the storage of the air-
plane. The rule is stated in 6A A1n. J ur., 363, et seq., 
Bailments, § 257, as follows: 
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''Authorities following the rule that a bailee 
acting without reward is liable only in case of 
gross negligence, viewed as a failure to exercise 
slight care or diligence, have held that the care 
required of such a bailee is not to he measured by 
that which a reasonably prudent man, or a person 
of ordinary prudence and care, would exercise, 
with reference to his own property under similar 
circumstances, and that such a bailee is not bound 
to ordinary diligence or that which the generality 
of mankind use in their own concerns.'' 
To the same effect, see 6A Am. Jur. 360-1, Bailments, 
~ 254. 
See also 8 ·C.J.S. 278, Bailments, ~ 28: 
"It is ordinarily stated that where a bailment 
is for the sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee is 
liable only for gross negligence or bad faith .... 
Primarily, gross negligence connotes the absence 
of slight care or diligence; and taking ordinary 
diligence or care and ordinary negligence as the 
Inean of the so called three degrees of care and 
negligence, slight care may be described as a less 
degree of care than ordinary, and slight diligence 
as that diligence which persons of less than com-
mon prudence take of their own concerns. Gross 
negligence has been defined as an mnission of the 
care which even the most inattentive and thought-
less never fail to take of their own concerns .... " 
See also to the same effect, Prosser on Torts, 2nd 
ed., 148. 
Again we quote from United Fire Insurance Co·m-
pamy v. Paramount Fur Service, Inc. supra: 
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"Ordinarily such constructive bailee will re-
ceive nothing frmn the owner of the property and 
will have no right to recover from such owner 
anything for what he does in caring for such prop-
erty so that he is in effect an uncompensated 
or so-called gratuitious bailee ... Hence there is 
no more reason for the law imposing upon such 
constructive bailee any duty to the owner with re-
spect to care for such property than there is for 
imposing such a duty on any other uncompensated 
or so-called gratuitous bailee. As a result no 
greater duty is ordinarily imposed upon such a 
constructive bailee. . " 
The court further said : 
''Although compensated bailee owes to his 
bailor a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect 
the bailed property, an uncompensated or so-
called gratuitous bailee does not owe to his bailor 
a duty to exercise such care to protect the bailed 
property. 
·'Par. 3 and 4 of the Syllabus of Toledo & 0. 
Central R. Co. v. Bowler & Burdick Co. 63 0. St. 
274, 58 N.E. 813, state that there can 'not' be such 
gross negligence 'unless' there is 'that gross ne-
glect of duty which amounts to willfulness and 
evinces a reckless disregard of the rights of 
others.' 
''. . . In deciding this case, it is sufficient to 
recognize, as all the authorities apparently do, that 
an uncompensated or so-called gratuitous bailee 
does not O\Ve to the owner of the bailed property 
a duty to exercise ordinary care and hence is not 
liable for ntere negligence with respect to the care 
of such property.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
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See also the cases cited in 96 A.L.R. at p. 909, et seq. 
In submitting this case to the jury, the court took 
the view that the destruction of the owner's airplane by 
fire gave rise to an inference of negligence on the part 
of defendant which would support a verdict for the plain-
tiff. This is undoubtedly correct in cases of bailment 
for hire and the Utah cases clearly so hold. However, 
we find no case from Utah or any other jurisdiction where 
it has been held that the destruction of the bailed goods 
by fire gives rise to an inference of gross negligence on 
the part of a gratuitous bailee. In fact the authorities 
hold that where, as here, the bailor has knowledge as to 
the place and the manner in which the goods are to be 
held, he is presumed to assent that the goods shall be so 
treated and cannot maintain an action for loss or dam-
age under such circumstances. See 6A Am. Jur. 366, 
Bailments, § 259 : 
"*** However, a bailor knowing the general 
character and habits of a gratuitous bailee, and 
the place where and the manner in which goods 
deposited are to be kept, is presumed to assent 
that the goods shall be so treated, and cannot 
maintain an action for loss or damage under such 
circumstances." 
To the same effect is 8 C.J.S., Bailments, Sec. 28: 
''So, where the bailor knows the habits of the 
bailee and the place and the manner in which the 
goods are to be kept, the law presumes his assent 
that his goods shall be thus treated, and, if lost or 
damaged he can maintain no action therefor.'' 
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Plaintiff failed to offer any specific evidence of 
gross negligence on the part of defendant. There is no 
authority which holds that destruction by fire, standing 
alone, is evidence of gross negligence, and where the 
owner has knowledge of the manner of storage, he con-
sents and agrees to such storage. It follows, therefore, 
that there was no evidence to warrant the submission 
of this case to the jury on the negligence count, and a 
verdict should have been directed in favor of the defend-
ant and against the plaintiff on that count, no cause of 
action. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE 
JURY, AS TO THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF, OR AS TO 
THE DUTIES OF DEFENDANT, OR AS TO THE LAW OF 
BAILMENT APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
If the court detennines adversely to our position on 
the first two points, we further invite attention to the fact 
that defendant was, if a bailee, at all, only a constructive 
bailee and therefore held only to slight diligence or other-
wise stated, liable only for gross negligence. However, in 
instructing the jury in its Instruction Number 6, the court 
instructed that if there was a bailment relationship, and 
if the defendant was guilty of negligence, a verdict could 
be returned in favor of the plaintiff on the negligence 
count. This was an incorrect statement of the law since 
as shown by the authorities heretofore cited, the burden 
was upon the plaintiff to prove not merely ordinary 
negligence, but gross neglience. Likewise, it was in-
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correct to advise the jury that the mere destruction of 
the plane by fire while in the possession of the defendant 
gave rise to an inference of negligence. This would be 
true in a bailment for hire situation, but was not appli-
cable to the case at bar. At the very least, the court 
should have instructed the jury that the fact that defend-
ant was a gratuitous bailee, placed upon him a lesser 
duty of care than he would have had as a bailee for hire. 
It follows that the plaintiff's verdict should not be per-
mitted to stand, and that even if the evidence was suffi-
cient to submit to the jury, a new trial should be granted 
so that the jury might be properly instructed on the law 
applicable to the evidence offered and received. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to prove a submissible case on the 
theory of negligence. It follows that the judgment on 
the second count should be set aside, and judgment en-
tered in favor of defendant, no cause of action, or in th~ 
alternative, a new trial should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSEN 
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
1205 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
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